DOE Grids CA

Certificate Policy

and

Certification Practice Statement

Version 2.10

 

Editor: Michael Helm

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 March 28, 2008


Table of Contents

Table of Contents. ii

1 Introduction. 1

1.1 Overview. 1

1.1.1 General Definitions. 1

1.2 Identification. 3

1.3 Community and Applicability. 3

1.3.1 Certification Authorities. 3

1.3.2 Registration Authorities. 4

1.3.3 End Entities. 4

1.3.4 Applicability. 4

1.4 Contact Details. 5

2 General Provisions. 6

2.1 Obligations. 6

2.1.1 CA and RA Obligations. 6

2.1.2 Subscriber Obligations. 7

2.1.3 Relying Party Obligations. 8

2.1.4 Repository Obligations. 8

2.2 Liability. 8

2.3 Financial Responsibility. 8

2.4 Interpretation and Enforcement 8

2.4.1 Governing Law. 8

2.5 Fees. 9

2.6 Publication and Repositories. 9

2.6.1 Publication of CA information. 9

2.6.2 Frequency of Publication. 9

2.6.3 Access Controls. 9

2.6.4 Repositories. 9

2.7 Compliance audit 10

2.8 Confidentiality. 10

2.9 Intellectual Property Rights. 10

3 Identification and Authentication. 11

3.1 Initial Registration. 11

3.1.1 Types of names. 11

3.1.2 Name Meanings. 11

3.1.3 Uniqueness of names. 11

3.1.4 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key. 11

3.1.5 Authentication of Individual Identity. 11

3.2 Routine Rekey. 12

3.3 Rekey After Revocation. 12

3.4 Revocation Request 12

4 Operational Requirements. 13

4.1 Certificate Application. 13

4.2 Certificate Request cancellation. 13

4.3 Certificate Issuance. 13

4.4 Certificate Acceptance. 13

4.5 Certificate Suspension and Revocation. 13

4.5.1 Circumstances for Revocation. 13

4.5.2 Who Can Request Revocation. 14

4.5.3 Procedure for Revocation Request 14

4.5.4 Circumstances for Suspension. 14

4.5.5 CRL Issuance Frequency. 14

4.5.6 Online Revocation/status checking availability. 14

4.5.7 Online Revocation checking requirements. 14

4.5.8 Other forms of revocation advertisement available. 14

4.6 Security Audit Procedures. 14

4.7 Records Archival 14

4.7.1 Types of Event Recorded. 14

4.7.2 Retention Period for Archives. 15

4.8 Key Changeover 15

4.9 Compromise and Disaster Recovery. 15

4.10 CA Termination. 15

5 Physical, Procedural and Personnel Security Controls. 16

5.1 Physical Security Controls. 16

5.2 Procedural Controls. 16

5.3 Personnel Security Controls. 16

6 Technical Security Controls. 17

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation. 17

6.1.1 Key Pair Generation. 17

6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Entity. 17

6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer 17

6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Users. 17

6.1.5 Key Sizes. 17

6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation. 17

6.1.7 Parameter Quality Checking. 17

6.1.8 Hardware/Software Key Generation. 17

6.1.9 Key usage Purposes. 17

6.2 Private Key Protection. 17

6.2.1 Private Key (n out of m) Multi person control 17

6.2.2 Private Key Escrow. 17

6.2.3 Private Key Archival and Backup. 18

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 18

6.4 Activation Data. 18

6.5 Computer Security Controls. 18

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements. 18

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating. 18

6.6 Life-Cycle Security Controls. 18

6.7 Network Security Controls. 18

6.8 Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls. 18

7 Certificate and CRL Profiles. 19

7.1 Certificate Profile. 19

7.1.1 Version number 19

7.1.2 Certificate Extensions. 19

7.1.3 Algorithm Object identifiers. 19

7.1.4 Name Forms. 19

7.1.5 Name Constraints. 20

7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier 20

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extensions. 20

7.1.8 Policy qualifier syntax and semantics. 20

7.2 CRL Profile. 20

7.2.1 Version. 20

7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions. 20

8 Specification Administration. 22

8.1 Specification Change Procedures. 22

8.2 Publication and Notification Procedures. 22

8.3 CPS Approval Procedures. 22

Appendix A: General Guidelines for DOEGrids Registration Authorities, Agents and Grid Admins. 23

A.1 Background. 23

A.2 Guidelines. 23

A.3 Agreements for Registration Authority, Agents and Grid Admins. 24

A.3.1 RA declaration to DOEGrids PMA. 24

A.3.2 Letter requesting assignment of RA Agent Role. 25

A.3.3 Letter requesting RA Agent Role. 25

A.3.4 Grid Admins. 25

Appendix B: PPDG RA operational procedure. 27

B.1 Background. 27

B.2.1 Membership. 27

B.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 27

B.3 PPDG VO Community. 27

B.4 Authentication procedures. 27

B.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 27

B.4.2 Communications. 27

B.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 28

B.4.3.1 Person Certificate. 28

1. A person requests a certificate from the DOE GRIDS CA community RM. 28

B.4.3.2 Host or Service Certificate. 28

B.5 Lifetime of certificates. 28

Appendix C: National Fusion Collaboratory's RA operational Procedures. 29

C.1 Purpose, Goals, Scope. 29

C.2 NFC RA staff (sponsors) 29

C.2.1 Membership. 29

C.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA (agent) 29

C.3 NFC VO Community. 29

C.4 Authentication procedures. 30

C.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 30

C.4.2 Communications. 30

C.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 30

C.4.3.1 Person Certificate. 30

C.4.3.2 Host or Service Certificate. 30

C.5 Lifetime of certificates. 31

Appendix D: NERSC RA operational procedures. 32

D.1 Background. 32

D.2 NERSC RA staff 32

D.2.1 Membership. 32

D.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 32

D.3 NERSC VO Community. 32

D.4 Authentication procedures. 33

D.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 33

D.4.2 Communications. 33

D.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 34

D.5 Lifetime of certificates. 34

Appendix E: Lawrence Berkeley Lab's RA operational Procedures. 35

E.1 Purpose, Goals and Scope. 35

E.2 VO RA staff 35

E.2.1 Membership. 35

E.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 35

E.3 LBNL Site Community. 35

E.4 Authentication procedures. 35

E.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 35

E.4.2 Communications. 35

E.4.3 Steps in Authentication for Certification. 36

E.5 Lifetime of certificates. 36

Appendix F: ORNL RA operational procedures. 37

F.1 Background. 37

F.2 ORNL RA staff 37

F.2.1 Membership. 37

F.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 37

F.3 ORNL Community. 37

F.4 Authentication procedures. 38

F.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 38

F.4.2 Communications. 38

F.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 39

F.5 Lifetime of certificates. 39

Appendix G: ANL RA operational procedures. 40

G.1 Background. 40

G.2 ANL RA staff 40

G.2.1 Membership. 40

G.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOEGrids CA. 41

G.2.3 Authentication to DOEGrids CA. 41

G.2.4 Communication with DOEGrids CA. 41

G.3 ANL Community. 41

G.4 Authentication procedures. 42

G.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 42

G.4.2 Communications. 42

G.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 42

G.5 Lifetime of certificates. 42

Appendix H: PNNL RA operational procedures. 43

H.1 Background. 43

H.2 PNNL RA staff 43

H.2.1 Membership. 43

H.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 43

H.3 PNNL Community. 43

H.4 Authentication procedures. 44

H.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 44

H.4.2 Communications. 44

H.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 44

H.5 Lifetime of certificates. 44

Appendix I: iVDGL RA operational procedures. 45

I.1 Purpose, Goals, Scope. 45

I.2 iVDGL RA staff (sponsors) 45

I.2.1 Membership. 45

I.2.2 POC with DOE GRIDS CA. 45

I.3 iVDGL VO Community. 45

I.4 Authentication Procedure. 46

I.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 46

I.4.2 Communications. 46

I.4.3 Steps in authentication for personal certification. 46

I.4.4 Steps in authentication for host/service certification. 46

I.5 Lifetime of certificates. 46

Appendix J: ESG RA operational procedures. 47

J.1 Background. 47

J.2 ESG RA staff 47

J.2.1 Membership. 47

J.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 47

J.3 ESG VO Community. 47

J.4 Authentication procedures. 48

J.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 48

J.4.2 Communications. 48

J.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 48

J.4.3.1 Person Certificate. 48

J.4.3.2 Host or Service Certificate. 48

J.5 Lifetime of certificates. 49

Appendix K: FNAL RA operational procedures. 50

K.1 Background. 50

K.2 FNAL RA staff 50

K.2.1 Membership. 50

K.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 50

K.3 FNAL Community. 50

K.4 Authentication procedures. 50

K.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 50

K.4.2 Communications. 51

K.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 51

K.4.3.1 Interactive Method. 51

K.4.3.2 Batch Method. 51

K.5 Lifetime of certificates. 51

Appendix L: Guidelines for Security Incident Response and Resolution. 52

L.1 Background. 52

L.2 Definitions. 52

L.3 Responsibilities. 52

L.4 Actions. 53

Appendix M: LCG RA operational procedures. 54

M.1 Background. 54

M.2 LCG RA staff 54

M.2.1 Membership. 54

M.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 54

M.3 LCG RA VO Community. 54

M.4 Authentication procedures. 55

M.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 55

M.4.2 Communications. 55

M.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 55

M.5 Lifetime of certificates. 56

Appendix N: Open Science Grid (OSG) RA operational procedures. 57

N.1 Background. 57

N.2 OSG RA staff 57

N.2.1 Membership. 57

N.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 57

N.3 OSG Community. 57

N.4 Authentication procedures. 58

N.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 58

N.4.2 Communications. 58

N.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 59

N.4.3.1 Person Certificate. 59

1. A person requests a certificate from the DOE GRIDS CA. 59

N.4.3.2 Service Certificate. 59

N.4.4 Logging. 59

N.5 Revocation procedures. 60

N.6 Lifetime of certificates. 60

N.7 Cyber Protection Plan. 60

Appendix O: General Guidelines for DOEGrids CA operations. 62

O.1 Background. 62

O.2 CA operations staff 62

O.3 CA operations. 62

Appendix P: Philips Research (US) RA operational procedures. 64

P.1 Background. 64

P.2 Philips Research (US) RA staff 64

P.2.1 Membership. 64

P.2.2 Point of Contact (POC) with DOE GRIDS CA. 64

P.3 Philips Research (US) Community. 64

P.4 Authentication procedures. 65

P.4.1 Authentication of individual identity. 65

P.4.2 Communications. 65

P.4.3 Steps in authentication for certification. 66

P.5 Lifetime of certificates. 66

Bibliography. 67

List of Changes. 68

 


1                   Introduction

1.1      Overview

This document is structured according to RFC 2527 [RFC2527]. Not all sections of RFC 2527 are used. Sections that are not included have a default value of "No stipulation".

This document describes the set of rules and procedures established by the DOE Grids Policy management Authority for the operations of the DOE Grids PKI service. ESnet operates the DOE Grids Public Key infrastructure under the authority of the DOE Grids PMA. ESnet and the data center housing the PKI servers are located at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, California.

This document will include both the Certificate Policy and the Certification Practice Statement for the DOE Grids PKI. The general architecture is a certificate authority with multiple Registration Authorities. The certificate authority is a subordinate of the ESnet root CA. There is a Registration Authority for each DOE GRIDS site or Virtual Organization. Each Registration Authority is responsible for the vetting of user identities of their community. Special guidelines for the individual RAs of the DOE GRIDS PKI are covered in the specific VO or Site Appendixes in this document.

DOEGrids PKI is a Traditional X.509 Public Key Certification Authority that complies with the IGTF Profile for a traditional X.509 Public Key Certification Authorities with secure infrastructure, version 4.0. It is the intent of the DOE Grids PKI to issue Identity and service certificates for use in Grids. These certificates are for DOE researchers and their colleagues. These certificates will be compatible with the Globus middleware that is used on these Grids.

The DOEGrids personal certificates by themselves are not to be used for determining Authorization. The DOEGrids personal certificate can be used only to assert the identity of the individual it was assigned to. Authorization decisions must be based on other criteria then the DOEGrids personal certificate.

1.1.1      General Definitions

Activation Data
Data values, other than keys, that are required to operate cryptographic modules and that need to be protected (e.g., a PIN, a pass phrase, or a manually-held key share).

Certification Authority (CA)
The entity / system that issues X.509 identity certificates (places a subject name and public key in a document and then digitally signs that document using the private key of the CA

Certificate Policy (CP)
A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. For example, a particular certificate policy might indicate applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods within a given price range.

Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
A statement of the practices, which a certification authority employs in issuing certificates.

Community RM
One or more RMs that serve multiple, low request rate, sites / Virtual Organizations.

DOE Grids PKI
Refers to the whole of the PKI including the electronic services, the CA managers, RA's, RAg's.

DOE Grids PKI members
Refers to the CA managers and the RA Points of Contact, who comprise a large subset of the PMA.

DOE Grids PKI service
Refers to the electronic services of the PKI, computers, web interfaces, email, etc.

End Entity
A system entity or person that is the subject of a public-key certificate and that is permitted and able to use, the matching private key only for a purpose or purposes other than signing an X.509 public key certificate; i.e., an entity that is not a CA.

Host Certificate
A Certificate for server certification and encryption of communications (SSL/TSL). It will represent a single machine. Host Certificates are used internally by the PKI service and are not issued to other sites/VOs

Owner
The human individual or organizational group that has valid rights to exclusive use of a subject name in a certificate. The process of registering the end entity of a certificate request is what maintains the binding between an owner and the subject name (DN).

Person Certificate
A certificate associated with a unique human being.

Policy Management Authority (PMA)
For the DOEGrids PKI this is a committee composed of the CA managers and representatives from the site/VO Registration Authorities. The PMA has direct responsibility for the CP/CPS and oversight of ESnet operations of the PKI.

Policy Qualifier
The policy-dependent information that accompanies a certificate policy identifier in an X.509 certificate.

Point of Contact

The member of a site/VO RA that has been chosen to handle all communications about policy matters with the DOE GRIDS PMA.

Private RM
RMs that serve high certificate request rate sites / Virtual Organizations, and that are operated by the site/VO.

Registration Authority (RA)
An entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of certificate subjects, but that does not sign or issue certificates (i.e., an RA is delegated certain tasks on behalf of a CA).

Registration Agent (RAg) or "Agent"
RAg is the entity that interacts with the RM in order to cause the CA to issue certificates.

Registration Manager (RM)
The RM is a front-end Web server for the CA that provides a Web user interface for CA subscribers and agents. The RM forwards certificate-signing requests to the actual CA (DOE GRIDS) to issue X.509 certificates.

Registered Owner
Once a certificate request has been verified, the ownership of the DN validated, and a certificate issued, the owner is considered to be the "registered owner" of the DN. See above for definition of "Owner".

Relying Party
A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate and/or digital signatures verified using that certificate.

Security Incident
An incident that has the potential of private key loss or compromise, regardless of if the compromise or loss was successful. Such incidents include but are not limited to user credential compromise, privilege escalation on systems known to contain private keys, accidental exposure of private key